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Background Analysing the evidence generated over decades, the World Health Report 2008
recommended the expansion of primary health care (PHC) to achieve better
population health, higher equity and lower costs. Over the last two decades, the
Iranian model of PHC has resulted in population health indices that match the
best in the region. Despite the extensive PHC networks in rural areas, there was
an expansion of private outpatient care and hospital-based services. This model
has been inadequate to meet the evolving health needs of the population and
increasingly difficult to afford. In response, a family medicine (FM) programme
has been implemented since August 2005, funded through Behbar, a model of
social insurance. In this paper, we aim to identify facilitators of and barriers to
implementation of FM in Iran.
Methods Data were collected between November 2006 and May 2007 through semi-
structured interviews at national (19 interviews), provincial (9) and local (43)
levels, and through a purposive document analysis. The framework approach
was used for analysing interviews. Document analysis followed a narrative
contextual framework. We interpreted data using an interpretive framework
consisting of multiple streams and network theories.
Results The introduction of Behbar provided FM advocates with the opportunity to place
FM on the policy agenda. They skilfully coupled the two policies and defined FM
as the only solution to fulfill Behbar. However, the manner in which policy was
formed was the main obstacle to desired FM implementation.
Conclusion The interpretive framework links the concept of outreach to the poor and
enhancing equity to rationing health services at a particularly opportune
moment in Iran. However, using windows of opportunity to implement a major
policy change, if it results in sacrifices in planning and preparedness, may harm
the policy and the future success in achieving its objectives.
Keywords Family medicine, rural health insurance, Behbar, implementation, multiple
streams, policy networks
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KEY MESSAGES
 Major changes can happen in health systems because of coincidental phenomena.
 Policy entrepreneurs can couple different processes, or streams, at opportune moments to make policy happen and push it
towards execution.
 The interpretive framework is useful for integrating policy community networks with broader events. It links the concept
of enhancing equity to rationing health services at an opportune moment in Iran.
 Using windows of opportunity to implement a major policy change, if it results in sacrifices in planning and
preparedness, may harm the policy and the future success in achieving its objectives.
Introduction
According to the World Health Report 2008, the five main features
that generally identify a functioning primary health care (PHC)
system are: effectiveness and safety; person-centredness; com-
prehensiveness and integration; continuity; and availability of a
regular entry point (gate-keeping) for access to secondary and
tertiary care (WHO 2008). Only in a limited number of
countries does PHC match such characteristics. Evidence
suggests that a functioning PHC sector offers crucial advantages
within health systems in terms of the health status of the
public, improving health-care-related outcomes (Davis et al.
2006; Campbell 2007), lower health disparities, more equitable
access to care, better quality of care (Bindman and Majeed
2003; Bodenheimer 2003) and lower costs (Lovkyte and
Padaiga 2001; Ferrer et al. 2005; Starfield et al. 2005). Health
care spending in countries with such a system has been shown
to be less than in settings with non-functioning or limited
primary care (Anderson et al. 2000). Hence, it is now crucial,
‘more than ever’ that health systems should invest in primary
health care (Starfield 1998; WHO Euro 2004; WHO 2008).
The PHC network in rural Iran has been described as an
‘incredible masterpiece’ (Tavassoli 2008). Mostly financed by
the state budget, nationwide implementation of the PHC
networks started in 1981 in Iran with the establishment of
health houses in rural areas. Community health workers
(Behvarz), who received basic training for the job and were
employed by the government, were the main providers at this
level and were supported by doctors based in health centres.
PHC focused on community participation and inter-sectoral
cooperation. It also actively and effectively implemented
strategies such as child immunization, oral rehydration,
family planning, prenatal care, respiratory infection manage-
ment as well as environmental health (Shadpour 2000; Takian
2009). The system was based on a novel and unique method of
data collection and registration (Taylor and Marandi 2008).
PHC was designed for both rural and urban areas, but in
practice remained comprehensive in villages (90% coverage)
and loose in cities (HERIMP 2004). As a result, dramatic
improvements were obtained in health indices over the follow-
ing years (Table 1).
Following the introduction of PHC, health indices in Iran are
now similar to the best in the region (WHO 2008; UNDP 2008).
However, in recent years the system has lacked the level of
flexibility to respond to emerging needs: increased life span of
the population, rising burden of non-communicable diseases,
migration to urban areas and growing expectations of the
public for further access to qualified doctors (Statistical Centre
of Iran 2007; Population Reference Bureau 2009). On the other
hand, an expanding private sector and the incorporation of
expensive medical technology into routine health care have
created new challenges for the health system (HERIMP 2004).
Health care provision is heavily reliant on out-of-pocket
expenditure (55%) (WHO 2009). In large cities, there is no
distinct role for GPs as gate-keepers. In particular, the current
PHC system seems unfit for addressing the observed shifts in
disease patterns towards chronic conditions and non-
communicable diseases (National Unit for Health Services
Reform 2005; Takian 2009). In response the government has
instituted health sector reform through the introduction of
two new policies: family medicine (FM) to improve the quality
of services, and Behbar (rural insurance for all) to enhance
affordability.
Aim—why this study matters
The process of implementation represents a neglected phase
of policy making, which despite its importance, is sometimes
seen as divorced from agenda setting and policy formulation
(Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Buse et al. 2005). It is useful
therefore, both retrospectively and prospectively, to study policy
formation, to understand policy failures and successes, in order
to improve the processes and hopefully the consequences of
future policies (Walt et al. 2008). This article investigates the
composition of, and interactions between, factors that led to the
implementation of FM in Iran. We were most interested in
understanding the facilitators and barriers to FM implementa-
tion. We used an interpretive framework consisting of ‘multiple
streams’ (Kingdon 2003) and network theories (Marsh and
Table 1 Selected health indices in Iran at the beginning of PHC (1981)
and present (2007)
Health index 1981 2007
General life expectancy, years 46.7 72
Infant mortality rate (IMR), deaths/1000 live births 94 29
Population growth rate, % 3.9 1.2
Under-5 death rate due to diarrhoea
per 1000 rural children
5 0.8
Under-5 death rate due to respiratory
infection per 1000 rural children
7.8 2.9
Overall vaccination coverage, % 40 98
Sources: WHO (2008), WHO (2009), MOH (2009).
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Rhodes 1992). Others have shown how useful the framework is
in explaining how policies are established, mostly in the context
of high-income countries (Harrison 2004; Walt et al. 2008). FM
is a strategic policy that has been branded the second biggest
reform in the Iranian health system after the introduction of
PHC in 1981 (Takian 2009). The unfolding of the story of this
policy’s formation may provide evidence to improve its imple-
mentation and prevent the recurrence of problems experienced.
It also expands the applicability of the interpretive framework
in the context of a lower-middle-income country.
Methods
Data collection and analysis
We used semi-structured interviews with purposefully identi-
fied individuals as the main means of data collection, plus
narrative analysis of selected documents. The interviews
followed a generic guide that incorporated the objectives of
the study (Appendix I), and were undertaken from November
2006 to May 2007 in two planned sequential phases. They were
digitally recorded and were fully transcribed.
We conducted a narrative analysis of policy documents—both
published and unpublished—produced by the Ministry of
Health & Medical Education (MOH), the Ministry of Welfare
& Social Security (MWSS), the Management & Planning
Organization and their affiliate institutions. These presented a
variety of aspects of the policy based on a defined categoriza-
tion table (Appendix II). The analysis of these documents
provided us with the means to identify key themes on which to
base the interview guide. We used the content analysis
approach illustrated by Ericson et al. (1991) to read, conceptu-
alize and interpret the text according to specific themes, and
picked out pieces of information relevant to the process of
implementation of FM in different stages. As documents are
social products, we selected and analysed them cautiously,
taking into account not only their content but also features
such as their production and the context in which they were
produced and functioned (Prior 2003). To do so, we took into
account four key considerations: authenticity (being original
and genuine), credibility (accuracy), representativeness (being
representative of the totality of the documents in their class)
and meaning (what they say) (Jupp 1996).
Interviews were conducted with different stakeholders
including policy makers at the national level (19 interviews),
managers and officials at provincial level (9), and practitioners,
managers and public representatives at local level (43). The
study was a concurrent analysis of a policy process in order to
understand and inform the implementation. In this study,
theory has informed, and been informed by, the data analysis.
The analysis followed a framework approach (Ritchie and
Spencer 1994; Pope et al. 1999; Rashidian et al. 2008), but also
accommodated new concepts and themes as they emerged
(Patton 1990; Green 1998).
Ethical considerations
The study was approved by the ethics committee of the London
School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), and was also
accepted by local authorities in Iran. Nonetheless, the field
study was categorized as service evaluation, which did not
require specific ethics approval.
Findings
Development of FM
In 2002, a small team of civil servants from the MOH, the
Medical Insurance Organization (MIO), which provides medical
insurance for almost 35% of the population (Statistical Centre
of Iran 2007), the Social Security Organization (SSO), which is
the biggest state insurance and pension organization, the
former Management & Planning Organization, which measured
and proposed the annual budgets, and the commission on
health in Parliament, was formed to study and benchmark
primary care in different settings (National Unit for Health
Services Reform 2005). This team aimed to re-engineer the
health system and fit it to the new challenges it now faced. The
team represented a policy community network (Marsh and
Rhodes 1992), led by the former Minister of Health (2001–05).
In order to obtain a parliamentary vote of confidence, he
promised to make FM a reality in Iran. Prior to this, he had
implemented a family doctor model in parts of the province
where he had been the Chancellor of the University of Medical
Science, which was also in charge of health care in the province
(1997–2001). Even though he had specialized as a surgeon, and
so would not have been initiated into the practices of primary
care, he transformed the policy subsystems and gave greater
prominence to the national unit for health sector reform within
the MOH. An executive team for health sector reform was also
established to train actors and prepare the environment for
change:
‘‘ . . . if the responsibility and enthusiasm of Dr. X was not there,
the one who spent his entire period in office to establish the reform
and personally attended and firmly defended FM in all occasions,
the implementation [of FM] would not have been started at
all . . . .’’ (A national health expert)
In 2004, the FM policy was successfully incorporated into the
fourth 5-year development programme of Iran (2004–09)
(MOHME 2005), which emphasized the role of the government to:
(1) Expand primary care to the entire population;
(2) Promote public health and reduce the risk of diseases and
other public challenges;
(3) Create logical and equitable public accessibility to health
services through rationing;
(4) Reduce out-of-pocket health care expenditure from
55% to 30% and catastrophic expenditure from 3% to 1%;
(5) Implement basic health insurance on the basis of family
medicine and referral.
Based on the constitution, the development programme was
approved by the parliament and no other bill or plan should
contradict it. The endorsement of FM in it was a fundamental
enterprise to secure the policy through political changes.
The team had consistently agreed on piloting FM in urban
areas (65% of the population)—where PHC was fragile
(Statistical Centre of Iran 2007)—in four provinces. However,
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pilot deployments were never fully implemented due to the
separation of the MIO from the MOH in early 2004. Along with
other state insurers, the MIO was restructured under the newly
established MWSS (National Unit for Health Services Reform
2005). The MOH lost its control over financing of desired pilots
and abandoned the plan eventually.
Windows of opportunity
Monetary windows
In March 2005, the parliamentary commission on health and
the Management & Planning Organization revised the 2005
annual budget bill in order to fund rural insurance for all
(Behbar). The bill increased the annual budget for ‘treatment’
in rural areas nearly five-fold, from 900 billion Rial to 4150
billion, and allocated the fund to the MIO (US$1.00¼ 8800 Rial
in March 2005). The budget increase continued in the following
years: 5000, 4850 and 5100 billion Rial in 2006, 2007 and 2008,
respectively. Such rises were not based on any calculation, nor
explicitly accounted for primary care:
‘‘Parliament approved the budget to narrow the differences between
rural and urban inhabitants. It bypassed us [with emphasis] and
allocated money for villagers not because of FM or referral, but
equalization of services for the poor . . . there was no calculation and
rationale behind that money. We always get worried once big
money comes in, because big money is always spent unright-
eous . . . .’’ (A national health official)
The amount had been demanded by neither the MIO nor the
MOH. Some funds were diverted from the annual budget
proposed by the Cabinet for Parliamentary Ratification of the
Behbar. The recently elected seventh Parliament of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, with a majority of revolutionary principalists,
revised the budget bill at their own discretion. This was not
anticipated by the MOH and MIO. Because of the emphasis on
FM, the fourth development programme was amended to
accommodate Behbar along with FM. The bill considered the
MOH as policy maker and service provider and the MIO as
purchaser of services (National Unit for Health Services Reform
2005). The MOH, which had failed to initiate FM in urban
areas due to lack of funds, saw Behbar as a financial
opportunity to execute FM:
‘‘ . . . during the last 5 years, we were looking for money to
implement FM. The government had abandoned the pilot imple-
mentation of FM in four cities due to lack of funding. Parliament
shifted money towards Behbar for assisting villagers. It was far
greater than our expectations and helped us so much . . . .’’ (A
senior MOH official)
To keep FM alive, the MOH changed its strategy overnight and
agreed with the MIO on implementing FM in rural areas and
small towns of fewer than 20 000 inhabitants, hosted by rural
health centres alongside health houses (Figure 1). This was a
clear diversion from the original plans of the MOH for FM in
urban areas:
‘‘The implementation was done slightly precipitately, although the
infrastructure was not prepared. We must have piloted it in some
provinces beforehand, however it was a good flick overall. If we had
waited to do it perfectly, there was no guarantee to start the
implementation ever . . . .’’ (A senior provincial manager)
The bill instructed the MIO to issue insurance log-books
universally to all residents of villages, nomadic communities
and small towns within 6 months (ending September 2005).
The aims were to reduce unnecessary costs, provide basic
services to all, make out-of-pocket cost equitable, re-engineer
payment methods, raise responsibility, improve audit perform-
ance and raise public satisfaction:
‘‘ . . .we built up pillars of FM whose base is still underground.
5000 billion Rial was spent for people who were deprived of ‘any
services’. Even if nothing happened, accessibility has increased
which itself reduces deaths. Nevertheless, the current status is
neither FM nor rural insurance . . . .’’ (A senior national health
official)
Coincidences
Almost at the same time that parliament approved Behbar, the
World Bank approved a loan to the government of Iran to
equip its infrastructure, including health centres. The MOH
used the loan to renovate the PHC infrastructure in rural areas,
purchase new equipment and reconstruct its transport sys-
tem, which empowered the rural health centres in accommo-
dating FM:
‘‘ . . . in terms of equipment, we had an agreement with the World
Bank, which incidentally became effective upon the implementation
of FM. This helped us to purchase most of the needed equip-
ment . . . .’’ (A member of national unit for reform)
‘‘We used the World Bank loan mainly to equip health
centres, particularly in deprived areas. Most of the money
was spent on renovating buildings, purchasing equipment and
vehicles, and building new health centres . . . .’’ (A national policy
maker)
The conditions set by the Bank for utilizing the loan resulted in
poor maintenance and wastage of parts of this loan (Takian
2009). Still, given the MIO’s refusal to pay for the infrastructure
and equipment out of Behbar resources, such an opportunity
was vital to bring about the implementation. Moreover, the
MOH acted as advocate for FM and was granted governmental
permission to implement a GP-based gate-keeping model in
mid-2004 in Bam—the southern city that was massively
destroyed by an earthquake in late 2003 with 45 000 casualties,
and was enjoying nationally and internationally provided funds
for reconstruction.
Family medicine
Prior to FM, the focal point for services and gate-keeping was
the behvarz, a local community health worker, who is trained
for 2 years to enable him or her to deliver basic health services
(Shadpour 2000; Taylor and Marandi 2008). The presence of
doctors in rural health centres was not universal and there was
no functioning pathway for referring patients to secondary care.
FM introduced doctors as gate-keepers (referral) and enhanced
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their accessibility for villagers, with the aim of promoting
family doctors as responsible guardians of the wellbeing of their
assigned community (National Unit for PHC Expansion &
Health Promotion 2007).
Experience of implementation
The universal implementation of FM that started in August
2005 has provided 25 million of the 72 million people of Iran
with Behbar log-books. Existing staff in rural health centres
have been augmented by 6000 GPs and 4000 midwives, and
these health centres have been better equipped by FM
resources:
‘‘ . . . enjoying Behbar, we settled doctors in 2500 rural health
centres, activated health centres and enhanced the public’s trust.
Utilization of services has dramatically gone up by 10 times
now . . . .’’ (A national policy maker)
However, the reform policies did not achieve the desired
outcomes because of the flaws in the content of the policy,
the context of its implementation and the way it was executed
in practice.
First, although the concept of FM was supported by many,
the policy was not tailored to respond to various peripheral
requirements. There was little oversight of policy to ensure
there was consistency between the two ministries (MOH and
MWSS). The policy was formulated by a small group of people
and imposed on others:
‘‘ . . . our health system is like a messy soup. A few national
policy-makers with close ties with the private sector, who mostly
think of maximizing their profit regardless of how and at what
cost, make the main decisions . . . .’’ (A senior national policy
maker)
FM policy was an attempt to respond to several longstanding
shortcomings in the health system and was eventually
implemented together with another policy, Behbar. However,
the merger failed as the two policies followed divergent
goals:
‘‘ . . . the main goal of Behbar was not health; rather it was social
insurance for villagers as the responsibility of the MWSS. Health
and treatment were considered as a shop window . . .By approving
the Behbar budget over night, parliament changed many
plans . . . .’’ (A senior insurance policy maker)
This statement should be interpreted in the context of the
health system in Iran, in which most primary care services are
provided by the MOH. Insurance organizations provide support
for access to hospital care and physician’s office-based care.
These latter groups are known literally in Iran as ‘treatment’
services, and not ‘health’.
Figure 1 Organizational structure of the local health system in Iran. Source: Malekafzali (2002)
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Secondly, the health system was not prepared to accommo-
date the reform. It lacked a defined macro-level philosophy of
governance, which made it difficult to steer FM towards a clear
destination and left it vulnerable to individuals’ discretion:
‘‘There is no theory behind the (health) system in this country. We
have handed over this bus to 100 drivers. Once reaching the
crossing, we ask passengers for their favourable direction: right or
left? Some passengers say: left. The next traffic light, some
passengers shout louder: right. We turn right then. At the end of
the day, we will reach nowhere . . . .’’ (A senior health official)
FM was not integrated with the financing system, and the
insight, knowledge and resources of current implementers,
particularly at the national level, were branded insufficient to
run the reform.
Thirdly, the policy was badly put into practice. The two main
implementers—the MOH and the MIO—pursued contradictory
goals. The former’s aim was to promote health via expanding
primary care services in rural and urban areas, whereas the
latter aimed at bridging the gap in service provision and
accessibility for the poor in rural areas (i.e. ‘treatment
services’):
‘‘ . . . the programme was executed by an insurer (MIO) which was
principally against FM from the beginning, while principal
designers of FM had been put aside . . . .’’ (A senior national
finance official)
The MIO was branded a ‘treatment’ focused body, being
reluctant by default to pay for primary care:
‘‘ . . . there is always a danger that one day the MIO will ruin the
reform. Having monetary control of the game and its mentality not
in line with primary care, it is quite likely that they will act only
as an insurer, and no more. They believe that whenever insured
people get sick, they will be responding accordingly. This is the
biggest disaster for FM ever . . . .’’ (A former senior health
official)
Moreover, their organizational past (the MIO was under the
MOH until 2004 and moved to another newly formed ministry,
the MWSS, just prior to the implementation of FM) led to
tension, as each attempted to prove its supremacy over the
other. They looked to each other as rivals not partners in
delivering a common goal.
As a result, the majority of actors were critical of FM. Health
staff did not consider the reform seriously and as a permanent
task. They were concerned that FM would stop shortly due to
unsustainable funding and a lack of political support. Such a
situation led to a lack of ownership, trust and cooperation
among health care practitioners, which ended in dissatisfaction,
frustration and waste of resources. Discretionary practice that
aimed to counter the constraints and other unpleasant conse-
quences of implementation of FM became a routine coping
mechanism that adversely affected the quality of services
(Lipsky 1980). Moreover, villagers, whose satisfaction and
provision of more equitable service was the aim, were unhappy
about rationing services, lack of freedom of choice and
differences from their urban counterparts. The current way of
implementation ignored the main features of primary care
including prevention and health promotion, and to some extent
may have threatened the concept of FM.
Discussion
‘Multiple streams’ in formulating FM
The formation of FM was affected by institutional and
situational factors including coincidence (merger with Behbar)
and external events (financial opportunities), which were the
main reasons for its existence and implementation and at the
same time may have caused its problematic content, flawed
implementation and problematic development. This resembles
Kingdon’s model (2003), according to which, policy changes
result from the synthesis of three streams:
‘‘Separate streams come together at critical times. A problem is
recognised, a solution is developed . . . a political change makes it
the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not
severe . . . these policy windows, the opportunities for action . . . pre-
sent themselves and stay open for only short periods.’’
He explains that the three streams occasionally flow together,
whereby a ‘policy window’ opens. This presents a temporal
opportunity for a ‘policy entrepreneur’ to promote a case and
for choices to be made (Zahariadis 1999). The parliament
opened the policy window by approving the Behbar funding
and coupling the streams together in the final days of the
Persian calendar (i.e. 12 March 2005; 20 March being the final
day of the year). The majority voted for the budget with little
challenge regarding diversion of funds. This was a crucial
measure to revitalize FM, which had been put aside mainly
because of fiscal restrictions. However, diversion of resources
adversely affected the sustainability of funding and inevitably
the execution of FM.
Policy networks can be a major source of inertia, unless policy
equilibrium is punctuated resulting in a policy innovation
(Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Radical policy change takes
place only when there is positive feedback in the policy
subsystem, for example the image or definition of a particular
proposal (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). Because of the strong
link that Behbar presented with the ideological purposes of the
Islamic Republic, including outreach to the poor and social
justice, it attracted parliamentary support and a sudden
diversion of funds. It was interesting that the ideology of the
conservative parliament helped the MOH from the reformist
government (which was in its final year) to implement a major
change in the health system. Thus, we ascribe the policy
entrepreneurs a more instrumental role in opening the policy
window than originally considered in the theory. As Kingdon
notes, the success of policy entrepreneurs to promote spill-over
in adjacent areas is enhanced by underlining a similar analogy
in legitimizing their arguments. At that time, the policy
network was never too closed to appreciate the opportunity
and pursue FM. Otherwise, there was a high likelihood that the
policy would fall on various government agendas, or the
opportunity would be lost.
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A ‘momentum phenomenon’
Incorporation of the two policies (FM and Behbar) also
resembled a ‘momentum phenomenon’. Explaining policy
formation at high levels in the United States, Walker (1971)
argues that when there is a breakthrough in a policy domain
which was previously neglected by the government, it is often
followed by a surge of administrative or legislative policies in
that domain that have persisted for a long time. The new policy
of Behbar revitalized FM. This initial policy shift and deliberate
association of Behbar with FM had spill-over effects. Such
effects secured the position of FM by ideologically matching it
with the slogan of the Islamic Revolution (equity and social
justice), which prevented the MIO from openly contradicting
FM. More importantly, given the governmental change that
took place a few weeks after the start of the implementation, as
the Minister of Health was certain to change in the new
Cabinet, a lot of resources (including time and attention) were
spent on FM so that the implementation was started in reality
and on the ground before the Minister left office. This made it
impossible for the new government to abandon the reform.
The series of activities required to implement FM resembled a
‘minimum winning coalition’ (Riker 1980), in which the goal is
to maximize net benefits at the margin, that is, in the short
term. In fact, the MOH compromised by accepting the merger
of the two policies. This was a deliberate and conscious attempt
to use a window of opportunity that may not have arisen
otherwise. The MIO also compromised to pay for primary care.
However, both players continuously found conflicts between
these compromises and their established routines.
Applicability of the interpretive framework in the
context of Iran
This research justifies the applicability of multiple streams
(problems, policies and politics) and network theories in
explaining the conditions in which FM was brought to the
fore in Iran, a lower-middle-income country. However, a few
contextual differences are revealed.
Firstly, the nature of the problems differed from those found
in high-income settings, where the interpretive frame was
developed. For instance, ideological beliefs such as equality and
social justice that are rooted in the revolutionary ideas of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, pushed decision makers towards
change. Also, expediency accelerated the process of policy
ratification. The extent to which evidence-based policy making
is practised varies between middle- and high-income countries.
Historically, this has been less the case in middle-income
countries, where individuals’ power as well as coincidental
events have steered policy more (Walt et al. 2008).
Secondly, political influences contributed to generating a
manifestation of FM in a way that differs from that suggested
by Kingdon. For instance, the role of individuals and their
supremacy over others to push the policy was crucial. Dye
(2001) argues that even in a democracy like the United States,
public policy is made from the top down, not from the bottom
up. In his view, public policy reflects the values, interests and
preferences of the governing elite. Dye separates policy devel-
opment from implementation, admitting that bureaucrats
may affect policy in implementation, but suggesting that all
decisions are monitored to ensure they are not altered
significantly. In addition, the adverse effects of ignoring issue
networks and front-level staff on quality of services, as Lipsky
(1980) points out, were justified in this study.
Thirdly, some additional components of Kingdon’s streams
such as opportunism and coincidence were revealed, without
which the policy was unlikely to materialize. Kingdon considers
contextual-based flexibility in strategies to fulfil goals.
However, diversions such as the merger of two contradictory
policies (FM with Behbar) are not addressed in the model.
Finally, a lack of pressure groups, non-governmental organ-
izations and civil society organizations, because of the nature of
the political structure, is among the main differences between
Western democracies and the Iranian model of governance.
Instead, intra-governmental advocates within the MOH pushed
FM onto the agenda. Moreover, legislative influx changes were
not attributed to shifting power from one party with a political
majority to another in Iran. Rather, revolutionary mottos and
ideological motivations were a main incentive. Despite funda-
mental diversities between the two political regimes at
macro-level, the third stream of Kingdon (politics) applied to
the context of Iran based on its unique structure of Islamic
republic, amid contextual modifications.
Conclusion
The multiple streams showed their sensitivity to the different
dynamics in problem definition, solution development and the
political processes that brought these three streams together at
a particularly opportune moment in Iran. This showed how the
impact of ideas could be explored without necessarily denying
the importance of self-interest. It emphasized actors’ under-
standings, priorities and discourses, pointing to the possibility
of delayed consequences of implementation such as changing
actors’ beliefs, norms, values or priorities. It showed that the
pace and tight steering of the process left relatively little room
for a broader public and political debate. The policy process
that led to what was called the second revolution in health
sector reform in Iran (Takian 2009) was actually determined
by relatively few actors involved in decisive moments, who
were pursuing goals with contradictory interpretations.
Understanding such a policy network is helpful in appreciating
the coupling of streams in real-life policy making and
implementation.
Kingdon’s multiple streams model was particularly helpful in
explaining the formation of FM in Iran because it integrates
policy community networks with broader events and addresses
the idea-versus-interests dilemma. It connects the broad polit-
ical event (the ideological stream and the revolutionary concept
of outreaching the poor and enhancing equity) to a narrower
within-sector development of health services (rationing and
service delivery on the basis of FM) in specific ways. The model
also indicates the importance of actors (a small circle of policy
makers) in addressing the significance of ideas in two ways.
First, solutions to respond to the problems were developed not
simply on the basis of efficiency or power, but also ideology.
Second, political ideology was a good heuristic in the ambigu-
ous environment of health policy in Iran.
THE FORMATION OF FAMILY MEDICINE IN IRAN 169
 at M
inistry of H
ealth Iran TRIA
L A
CCESS on June 23, 2012
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations. First, policy evaluation
requires a longer timeframe, ‘a decade or more’ (Sabatier 2007)
as minimum, which was not met in this study.
Secondly, most data were obtained from semi-structured
interviews. Although we used other methods to enhance
credibility—collecting data over time, in different places and
from people at different levels, and with contextual analysis—
we cannot be certain of respondents’ underlying rationaliza-
tions, given the socio-political considerations in the specific
context of health care reforms in Iran. Despite adopting
multiple methods to enhance rigour (Denzin 1989), we could
not simply combine data in order to arrive at an overall truth
(Armstrong et al. 1997; Silverman 1998). We chose simplicity,
rather than an illusory search for the full picture, by adopting
an interpretive approach based on selected theories, rather than
a positivist approach. We acknowledge the findings might be
interpreted differently by using other analytical frameworks.
Thirdly, the interpretive framework can be criticized for not
providing tools for a meso- or micro-level analysis of events
in the three streams or closer examination of the coupling
process. The key message is that these factors influenced the
direction of the policy but did not determine or facilitate its
implementation on their own. Further, the role of policy
entrepreneurs is vaguely defined, but it does introduce the
notion of interested actors attempting to navigate the turbulent
and disconnected streams. Exactly how these agents operate
and the impact of their values and norms on their function are
not specified.
Fourthly, epistemological subjectivity is inevitable in a study
such as this, which investigates sensitive issues of ‘high politics’
(Walt et al. 2008) and requires engaging with policy elites
(Shiffman 2007). We admit that our position might have
influenced not only access to data but also knowledge
construction (Parkhurst 2002). However, the first author’s
position in this research was both insider and outsider, which
widened avenues for cooperation at various levels. In addition,
he was neutral to the implementation of FM and was not
committed to the government, which made him substantially
objective in gathering and interpreting the data.
Finally, the reliance on idiosyncratic reasons that led to
policy change threatens the generalizability of the findings.
However, variations by policy sector over time are a permanent
feature of policy analysis and this variation affects the value of
different models of policy change (Cairney 2007). Given the
limited number of studies on formation of public policies in
Iran, the findings might be helpful for other settings and
scenarios.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Professor Nick Black and Professor
Nick Mays, LSHTM, for their invaluable input and advice on
designing this study and interpreting results. We thank the
reviewers who provided us with their invaluable comments on
the first draft of this manuscript. We are also thankful to Dr
Ralph Hibberd, the School of Pharmacy, University of London,
and Ali Tawfik, LSHTM, for their comments on the revised
manuscript.
References
Anderson GF, Hurst J, Hussey PS, Jee-Hughes M. 2000. Health spending
and outcomes: trends in OECD countries, 1960–1998. Health Affairs
19: 150–7.
Armstrong D, Gosling A, Weinman J, Marteau T. 1997. The place of
inter-rater reliability in qualitative research: an empirical study.
Sociology 31: 597–606.
Baumgartner FR, Jones BD. 1991. Agenda dynamics and policy
subsystems. Journal of Politics 53: 1044–74.
Baumgartner FR, Jones BD. 1993. Agenda and Instability in American
Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bindman AB, Majeed A. 2003. Organization of primary care in the
United States. British Medical Journal 326: 631– 4.
Bodenheimer T. 2003. Primary care in the United States. Innovations in
the primary care in United States. British Medical Journal 326:
796–9.
Buse K, Mays N, Walt G. 2005. Making Health Policy. 1st edition. London:
Open University Press.
Cairney P. 2007. A ‘‘multiple lenses’’ approach to policy change: the case
of tobacco policy in the UK. British Politics 2: 45–68.
Campbell JL. 2007. Provision of primary care in different countries.
British Medical Journal 334: 1230–1.
Davis K, Schoen C, Schoenbaum SC et al. 2006. Mirror, Mirror on the Wall:
An Update of the Quality of American Healthcare Through the Patient’s
Lens. New York: Commonwealth Fund. Online at: http://www
.cmwf.org/usr_doc/Davis_mirrormirror_915.pdf.
Denzin NK. 1989. Strategies of multiple triangulation. In: Denzin NK
(ed.). The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods.
3rd edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Dye T. 2001. Top-Down Policy Making. London: Chatham House.
Ericson R, Baranek P, Chan J. 1991. Representing Order: Crime,
Law and Justice in the News Media. Milton Keynes: Open University
Press.
Ferrer RI, Hambridge SJ, Maly RC. 2005. The essential role of
generalists in health care systems. Annals of Internal Medicine 142:
691–9.
Green J. 1998. Commentary: Grounded theory and the constant
comparative method. British Medical Journal 316: 1064–5.
Harrison MI. 2004. Implementing Change in Health Systems, Market Reforms
in the United Kingdom, Sweden & the Netherlands. London: Sage
Publications Ltd.
HERIMP. 2004. Proceedings of a Seminar of Challenges and Development
Vision in Iran. Tehran: Higher Educational and Research Institute in
Management and Planning, pp. 19–26.
Jupp V. 1996. Documents and critical research. In: Sapsford R, Jupp V
(eds). Data Collection and Analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications, pp. 298–316.
Kingdon J. 2003. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. 2nd edition. New
York: HarperCollins.
Lipsky M. 1980. Street-level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public
Services. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Lovkyte L, Padaiga Z. 2001. Physician workforce reform in Lithuania: an
inevitable transition. Cahiers de sociologie et de de´mographie me´dicales
41: 347–68.
Marsh D, Rhodes RAW. 1992. Policy communities and issue networks:
beyond typology. In: Marsh D, Rhodes RAW (eds). Policy Networks
in British Government. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ministry of Health & Medical Education (MOHME). 2005. The 4th
5-Year Comprehensive Progress Programme of the Islamic Republic
of Iran. National Legislation of Progress in the Health Sector.
Tehran: Ministry of Health & Medical Education.
170 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNING
 at M
inistry of H
ealth Iran TRIA
L A
CCESS on June 23, 2012
http://heapol.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
MOH. 2009. Three Decades of Endeavor on the Healthcare Front. Status Report
on Health Care and Medical Education in Iran. Tehran: Ministry of
Health & Medical Education.
National Unit for Health Services Reform. 2005. Health System Reform
in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 2nd edition. Tehran: National Unit
for Health Services Reform, Ministry of Health & Medical
Education.
National Unit for PHC Expansion & Health Promotion. 2007. The
Operational Instruction for FM and Behbar, Version 8.00. Tehran:
National Unit for PHC Expansion & Health Promotion, Ministry of
Health & Medical Education.
Parkhurst JO. 2002. The Ugandan success story? Evidence and claims of
HIV-1 prevention. The Lancet 360: 78–80.
Patton MQ. 1990. Qualitative Evaluation & Research Methods. 2nd edition.
London: Sage.
Pope C, Ziebland S, Mays N. 1999. Analysing qualitative data. In:
Pope C, Mays N (eds). Qualitative Research in Health Care. London:
BMJ Publishing Group.
Population Reference Bureau. 2009. Data by geography: Iran, summary.
Online at: http://www.prb.org/Datafinder/Geography/Summary.
aspx?region¼ 141&region_type¼ 2.
Prior L. 2003. Using Documents in Social Research. London: Sage
Publications.
Rashidian A, Eccles MP, Russell I. 2008. Falling on stony ground?
A qualitative study of implementation of clinical guidelines’
prescribing recommendations in primary care. Health Policy 85:
148–61.
Riker W. 1980. Implications from the disequilibrium of majority rule for
the study of institutions. American Political Science Review 90: 534–54.
Ritchie J, Spencer L. 1994. Qualitative data analysis for applied policy
research. In: Bryman A, Burgess R (eds). Analysing Qualitative Data.
London: Routledge, pp. 173–94.
Sabatier PA. 2007. Theories of the Policy Process: Theoretical Lenses on Public
Policy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sabatier PA, Jenkins-Smith H. 1993. Policy Changes and Learning: An
Advocacy Coalition Approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Statistical Centre of Iran. 2007. Results of 10th Year Household Survey.
Tehran: Statistical Centre of Iran.
Shadpour K. 2000. Primary health care networks in the Islamic Republic
of Iran. Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 6: 822–5.
Shiffman J. 2007. Generating political priority for maternal mortality
reduction in 5 developing countries. American Journal of Public
Health 97: 796–803.
Silverman D. 1998. The quality of qualitative health research: the
open-ended interview and its alternatives. Social Science in Health 4:
104–18.
Starfield B. 1998. Primary Care: Balancing Health Needs, Services, and
Technology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Starfield B, Shi l, Macinko J. 2005. Contributions of primary care to
health systems and health. Milbank Quarterly 83: 457–502.
Takian A. 2009. Implementing Family Medicine in Iran: Identification of
Facilitators and Obstacles. PhD thesis submitted to the University
of London, UK.
Tavassoli M. 2008. Iranian health houses open the door to primary care.
Bulletin of the World Health Organization 86: 585–6.
Taylor S, Marandi A. 2008. Social determinants of health and the
design of health programmes for the poor. British Medical Journal
337: 290.
UNDP. 2008. Human Development Indices: A Statistical Update 2008.
Online at: http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/2008/countries/country_
fact_sheets/cty_fs_IRN.html.
Walker J. 1971. Setting the agenda in the U.S. Senate: a theory of
problem selection. British Journal of Political Science 7: 423–55.
Walt G, Shiffman J, Schneider H, Murray SF, Brugha R, Gilson L. 2008.
doing health policy analysis: methodological and conceptual
reflections and challenges. Health Policy and Planning 23: 1–10.
WHO Euro. 2004. What are the Advantages and Disadvantages of Restructuring
a Health Care System to be More Focused on Primary Care Services?.
Copenhagen: World Health Organization Regional Office for
Europe, Health Evidence Network.
WHO. 2008. World Health Report 2008: Primary Health Care, Now More Than
Ever. Geneva: World Health Organization. Online at: http://www
.who.int/whr/2008/whr08_en.pdf.
WHO. 2009. World Health Statistics 2009. Online at: http://www.who
.int/whosis/whostat/2009/en/index.html.
World Bank. 1999. Health financing reform in Iran: principles and
possible next steps. Prepared for the Social Security Research
Institute, Health Economics Congress, Tehran, Iran. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Zahariadis N. 1999. Ambiguity, time, and multiple streams. In:
Sabatier P (ed.). Theories of the Policy Process. 1st edition. Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, pp. 73–93.
Appendix I
Interview guides for three levels
1. National level
‘Implementing Family Medicine in Iran:
Identification of Facilitators & Obstacles’
Amirhossein Takian
Interview guide to be used at national level
Date & venue:
Name & position of interviewee:
General questions and material that must be covered during
interviews with officials at national level, which are subject to
change; deletion; expansion and refinement according to the position
and compliance of individuals (will be employed reflexively). Selected
theories of implementation, results of reviewing empirical articles on
facilitators of and obstacles to the implementation in health care and
insights from exploratory visits to Iran have been considered to define
these guide questions.
(1) First of all, please explain your broad perception of family
medicine (FM) in Iran.
(2) To what extent do you think the current PHC (primary
health care) organization, in which FM is being imple-
mented, has the capacity for proper implementation of
FM? What aspects need change/improvement, etc.?
(3) What is your opinion concerning the policy of FM itself?
Please discuss and explain your understanding with
evidence.
(4) Regarding the policy, to what extent do you think it is
easily interpreted and clear in content?
(5) To what extent do you think that FM has been accepted/
rejected by providers and stakeholders (not public)?
Please discuss with evidence.
(6) How well has the policy been explained to you?
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(7) So far, have you received any feedback from other policy
makers and stakeholders from either the centre or
periphery regarding the implementation of FM? Please
discuss.
(8) What is your perception of the role of insurance bodies in
this implementation?
(9) If you had an absolute power to make the policy and
conduct the change, what would you do to maximize the
insurance companies’ efficiency in implementing FM?
(10) As far as you are aware, how is FM interpreted by
different layers at centre and periphery?
(11) How do you interpret the political context and its role in
the implementation? Please give reasons and evidence
and discuss.
(12) As a national official and well-informed person, do you
think that the implementation of FM has been properly
and adequately armed with adequate logistics preparation
(financial, human resources, and equipment)?
(13) Do you have any evidence that shows how far the policy
of FM and its current process of implementation have
been accepted by people? Please address the aspects that
need change (either in the policy or implementation) and
give your reasons and substitutes.
(14) What is your opinion about merging FM into Behbar
(rural insurance for all)? Please discuss in detail.
(15) (At the end of the interview) Is there any specific issue
you would like to discuss further, add to what you have
said, or any particular factor which you think influences
the implementation (facilitates or obstructs) and which
we did not discuss in our interview? Please feel free to
talk about it while summarizing your talk.
With special thanks for your time and invaluable
contribution.
2. Provincial officials and service
providers at local level
‘Implementing Family Medicine in Iran:
Identification of Facilitators & Obstacles’
Amirhossein Takian
Interview guide to be used at provincial and local
levels
Date & venue:
Name & position of interviewee:
General questions and material that must be covered during
interviews with officials and providers at local level. They are subject
to change; deletion; expansion and refinement according to the position
and compliance of individuals (will be employed reflexively). Selected
theories of implementation, results of reviewing empirical articles on
facilitators of and obstacles to the implementation in health care and
insights from exploratory visits to Iran have been considered to define
these guide questions.
(1) First of all, please explain your broad perception of family
medicine (FM) in Iran with a focus on your province (for
providers, with more focus on their relevant health
centres and target population).
(2) To what extent do you think the current PHC (primary
health care) organization, in which FM is being imple-
mented, has the capacity for proper implementation of
FM? If it is flawed, what aspects need change/improve-
ment, etc.?
(3) What is your opinion concerning the policy of FM itself?
Please discuss and explain your understanding with
evidence.
(4) Regarding the policy, to what extent do you think it is
easily interpreted and clear in content? Please discuss
according to evidence and your actual experience of the
implementation so far.
(5) How well has the policy been explained to you?
(6) Please discuss how communication has affected the
process of implementation (in your province or your
centre according to the position of the respondent) of FM
from your point of view. Please particularly stress the role
of mass media and local media in your discussion.
(7) So far, have you received any feedback from other policy
makers and stakeholders from either the centre or within
Golestan regarding the implementation of FM?
(8) How do you deal with this feedback?
(9) How do you conceive the implementation of FM as a
policy? Please stress your understanding of the reality of
the process of policy making regarding FM.
(10) What is your perception of the role of insurance bodies in
this implementation?
(11) If you had an absolute power to make the policy and
conduct the change, what would you do to maximize the
insurance companies’ efficiency in implementing FM, in
Golestan and universally?
(12) For local officials: As far as you are aware, how is FM
interpreted by different layers at centre and periphery? To
what extent has it been accepted/rejected by relevant
people (policy makers, providers, public) in Golestan?
Please discuss.
(13) How do you interpret the political context and its role in
the implementation? Please give reasons and evidence
and discuss.
(14) To what extent do you think that your province or your
health centre has been properly and adequately
armed with adequate logistics preparation (financial,
human resources, and equipment) for implementing FM
so far?
(15) Do you have any evidence that shows how far the policy
of FM and its current process of implementation have
been accepted by the public? Please address the aspects
that must change (either in policy or implementation)
and give your reasons and substitutes.
(16) What is your opinion about merging FM into Behbar
(rural insurance for all)? Please discuss in detail.
(17) (At the end of the interview) Is there any specific issue
you would like to discuss further, add to what you have
said, or any particular factor which you think influences
the implementation (facilitates or obstructs) and which
we did not discuss in our interview? Please feel free to
talk about it while summarizing your talk.
With special thanks for your time and invaluable
contribution.
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3. Public representatives
‘Implementing Family Medicine in Iran:
Identification of Facilitators & Obstacles’
Amirhossein Takian
Interview guide to be used at local level for the
public’s representatives
Date & venue:
Name & position of interviewee:
General questions and materials that must be covered during
interviews with representatives of the public at local level. They are
subject to change; deletion; expansion and refinement according to the
position and compliance of individuals as well as results of interviews at
national level and other findings from the local level (will be employed
reflexively). Selected theories of implementation, results of reviewing
empirical articles on facilitators of and obstacles to the implementation
in health care and insights from exploratory visits to Iran have been
considered to define these guide questions.
(1) First of all, please explain your broad perception of family
medicine (FM) in Iran with a focus on what you have
observed in your area. Simply, what does FM mean to
you?
(2) As a user of services, to what extent do you think the
current PHC (primary health care) organization, in which
FM is being implemented, has the capacity for proper
implementation of FM? What aspects need change/
improvement, etc.? Please give reasons, evidence and
discuss.
(3) How well has the policy been explained to you? (NB Ask
more questions to understand the role of the informing
procedure on his/her perception of implementation.)
(4) What is your general opinion concerning FM itself?
(5) Do you use services under the auspices of FM (Behbar) in
your village? Are there differences between those and the
ones that were being delivered through PHC?
(6) In each case, please give reasons and discuss. Are you
aware of other centres? Can you compare those with your
centre?
(7) How is the behaviour of staff that are in charge of
delivering care with them? Please indicate your evidence
and discuss the impacts of these factors in detail.
(8) In case of need for health care, where is the first point
you refer to seek care in your area? If interviewee says
health centre, go deeper and ask why? If they say
somewhere else, ask precisely why he/she does not go to
the health centre, trying to understand his/her objections
in order to find facilitators and obstacles.
(9) What services do you prefer to use from the health centre
and why?
(10) Have you ever given any feedback regarding implemen-
tation of FM to providers and officials? If yes, how did
you do that?
(11) Was it responded to or acted on? What was the result?
(12) Since it was started, have you seen any changes in FM
and the way that is being implemented in your area?
(13) What is your perception of the role of insurance bodies in
this implementation?
(14) If you had an absolute power to make the policy and
conduct the change, what would you do to maximize the
insurance companies’ efficiency in implementing FM?
(15) Have you or your relatives been referred to a higher level
for seeking care by a family doctor? How did you find
that referral and your acceptance of it?
(16) As far as you are aware, how is FM interpreted by other
people in your area? To what extent has it been accepted/
rejected by them?
(17) How do you interpret the political context and its role in
the implementation? Please give reasons and evidence
and discuss.
(18) To what extent do you think that your health centre has
been properly and adequately armed (financial, human
resources and equipment) for implementing FM so far?
(19) (At the end of interview) Is there any specific issue you
would like to discuss further, add to what you have said,
or any particular factor which you think influences the
implementation (facilitates or obstructs) and which we
did not discuss in our interview? Please feel free to talk
about it while summarizing your talk.
With special thanks for your time and invaluable
contribution.
Appendix II
List of categories for selecting and
analysing documents
We selected documents that:
 explained the history of development of the policy;
 described policy (FM) revolution and revisions, its content,
political and social debates on that, and reasons that
resulted in its merger with Behbar;
 reported the progress of implementation of FM and Behbar
and challenges ahead, annually, quarterly or on an irregular
basis;
 reported the results of auditing performance of practitioners
and managers with regard to implementation of FM;
 described the policy, its benefits, prospective outcomes, etc.,
for various groups of stakeholders, either presentations or
correspondence;
 explained the progress of implementation, stakeholders’
attitude and expectations, and decisions made to address
such concerns, mainly newspapers and magazines, as well as
surveys and intra/inter-organizational correspondence, con-
fidential or non-confidential;
 were prepared to educate various groups of practitioners and
public regarding the policy and its revisions.
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